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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 18038

vs.
CHARLES KERMIT LESLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of Production of a
Controlled Substance (marijuana), a felony, Utah Code Annotated
§58-37-8 (1953 as amended), and Criminal Trespass, a Class "C"
Misdemeanor, Utah Code Annotated §76-6-206 (1953 as amended),
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant, Charles Kermit Lesley, was charged in a two
count information with Production of a Controlled Substance
(marijuana), a felony, Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8, and Criminal Trespass, a Class "C" Misdemeanor, Utah Code Annotated
§76-6-206.

On August 17, 1981, he was convicted by a jury of

both charges.

On September 23, 1981, the appellant was sen-

tenced to serve a term not to exceed five years and a $900.00
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fine and a term not to exceed 90 days and a $299.00 fine, sentences to run concurrently.

Execution of sentence was stayed

and appellant was placed on probation subject to payment of
$1,199.00 in fines and other probation conditions.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of guilt entered
against him as to Count I with orders to the trial court to
dismiss, or grant a new trial.

Appellant seeks reversal of

the judgment of guilt entered against him as to Count II, with
orders to the trial court to dismiss with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 16, 1981, attorney for the defendant Charles
Kermit Lesley, filed a motion to suppress evidence.
on Appeal, page 12.

Record

The memorandum in support of that motion

contended that the arresting officer did not have probable cause
to arrest defendant and that the search following the illegal
arrest was in violation of defendant's Constitutional rights
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.

R. 13-18.

That motion was denied and the evidence was admitted at trial.
The facts adduced at trial from various witnesses are as
follows:

On the morning of August 21, 1980, Forest Service

employee Eugene Lowin accompanied Narcotics Detective Steve
Alexander and approximately ten local law enforcement officers
to an area in Red Butte Canyon where marijuana was growing.
The purpose for this expedition was to seize items in connection with the marijuana farm in an attempt to locate the parties
responsible for its production.

R. 115.
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Eugene Lowin testified that there was a road leading up
toward the compound area where the marijuana was growing.

He

also stated that only the first of three locked gates across
the road was posted "No Trespassing".

Lowin also responded

that it was possible to enter on foot and not see the signs
on the first gate.

R. 14-15.

Dectective Alexander testified that upon his arrival, he
noticed a person in or near the compound where the marijuana
was growing.

R. 117.

That sighting was made by him from a

distance of about one-quarter mile, without the use of binoculars.

R. 138.

Following a search of the area, an individual

was arrested, that person being the defendant-appellant, Charles
Kermit Lesley.
The time of arrest is not clear, and portions of the testimony of Lowin and Alexander are in conflict.

Lowin testified

that he did not see anyone that day other than officers until
he saw Mr. Lesley being accompanied to the compound by sheriff's
officer.

R. 110.

He advised the officer at that time that

Lesley was trespassing.

R. 101.

Alexander testified that he asked Lowin if Lesley was
trespassing.

R. 119.

Later, on cross examination, Alexander

states that he found Lesley some fifty yards from the compound
and arrested him, stating to the court "I just found out he
was trespassing and arrested him."

R. 141.

Alexander further

states that upon finding Lesley and inquiring of his presence,
Lesley stated he was just hiking.

R. 141-142.
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Near the close of the first day of trial, counsel for
defendant Lesley moved for a mistrial on the ground that one
of the jurors had been dozing throughout the trial.
was denied.

The motion

R. 191.

The trial court's instructions were presented to the jury
with no objection as to their substances from either counsel.
R. 213.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of the crimes of Production of a Controlled Substance and Criminal Trespass, as charged
in the Information, and judgment was entered thereon.

Appellant

now takes this appeal from judgment of the trial court.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE FINDING
OF INTENT TO COMMIT THE FELONY OF PRODUCTION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
The appellant asserts that the trial court erred in its
instruction to the jury regarding the elements necessary to
convict the defendant of Criminal Trespass.

The entire instruc-

tion was given as set forth below:
INSTRUCTION NO. 12
Before you can convict the defendant of
the crime of Criminal Trespass, Count II,
you must find from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, all of the following
elements of that crime:
1. That on or about the 21st day of
August, 1980, in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the defendant Charles Kermit
Lesley, unlawfully entered the property
of the U.S. Government.
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2. That at the time of said entry the
defendant, Charles Kermit Lesley, intended
to commit the crime of Production of a
Controlled Substance.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the essential
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt it is your duty to convict the
defendant of Criminal Trespass.
On the
other hand, if the evidence has failed
to so establish one or more of said elements, then you must find the defendant
not guilty.
Appellant's appeal of this issue is allowable to prevent
manifest injustice, pursuant to Rule l9(c), Utah Code of Criminal Procedure.
A.

Utah Code Annotated §77-35-19(c),

(Supp. 1981).

INTENT TO COMMIT A FELONY IS NOT AN
ELEMENT OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

The defendant was charged in Count II of the Information
with Criminal Trespass, a Class "C" Misdemeanor, a violation
of Utah Code Annotated §77-6-206 (1953 as amended).
~

This charge arose from allegations (to the effect) that
the appellant entered the property of the United States Government with intent to commit the crime of Production of a
Controlled Substance. 1

1. In assessing the substance and sufficiency of this charge,
it is necessary to compare and consider the Criminal Trespass
statute with the felony counterpart, Utah Code Annotated
§76-6-202 (1953 as amended).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Footnote 1 continued)

These two statutes, with emphasis provided to pertinent
sections, are set forth below:
76-6-202. BURGLARY.
(1) A person is guilty of burglary
if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
(2)
Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it
was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of
the second degree.
76-6-206. CRIMINAL TRESPASS.
(1) For purposes of this
section "enter" means intrusion of the entire body.
(2)
A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined in sections
76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204:
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) Intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person
thereon or damage to any property thereon; or
(ii)
Intends to commit any crime, other than theft
or a felony;
(iii) Is reckless as to whether his presence will
cause fear for the safety of another.
(b) Knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters
or remains on property as to which notice against entering is
given by:
(i) Personal communication to the actor by the owner
or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner; or
(ii) Fencing or other enclosure obviously designed
to exclude intruders; or
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably likely to come
to the attention of intruders.
(3) A violation of subsection (2)(a) is a class C misdemeanor unless_ it was committed in a dwelling, in which event
it is a class B misdemeanor. A violation of subsection (2)(b)
is an infraction.
(4)
It is a defense to prosecution under this section:
(a) That the property was open to the public when the
actor entered or remained; and
(b) The actor's conduct did not substantially interfere
with the owner's use of the property.

-6-
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At· trial, the jury was correctly instructed as to the elements of Criminal Trespass, Utah Code Annotated §76-6-206(2)(a)
(1953 as amended), Instruction No. 11, R.59.

However, the jury

was then misinstructed as to findings necessary to convict the
defendant of Criminal Trespass.

Instruction No. 12, supra.

The explicit language of the Criminal Trespass statute,
subsection (2)(a)(ii), makes it clear that the accused must
intend to commit a crime which is not a felony.

Felonious

intent is an element of burglary, not criminal trespass.

To

instruct a jury otherwise is to frustrate the legislative intention of the Criminal Trespass statute.
If the state wished to prosecute the appellant for his
alleged unlawful entry coupled with felonious intent, it should
have charged the appellant with burglary.

The State's prosecu-

tion of the appellant for Criminal Trespass should be supported
by evidence of intent to commit a crime other than theft or
a felony, evidence which is conspiciously absent from the trial
record.

2

Instead, the appellant was charged with and the jury

was instructed as to an offense which borrows language from
two separte statutes and fulfills the requirements of neither.
2. Count I of the Information charges the appellant with the
following:
PRODUCTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Felony, at Red Butte
Canyon, on or about August 21, 1980, in violation of Title 58,
Chapter 37, Section 8(l)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, in that the defendant CHARLES K. LESLEY did knowingly
and intentionally produce a controlled substance, to-wit: Marijuana by means of cultivating marijuana plants;
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B.

ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF
CRIMINAL TRESPASS TO STAND WOULD RESULT
IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE.

The defendant in a criminal prosecution is entitled to
appeal a final judgment of conviction.

Utah Code Annotated

§77-l-6(g) and §77-35-26(b)(l), (Supp. 1981).

Generally, errors·

assigned with regard to jury instructions must be objected to
at trial in order to be preserved as an issue upon appeal, in
conformity with Rule 51, Utah Rules of

Civil

Procedure.

See State v. Erickson, Utah, 568 P.2d 750 (1977), State v. Kazda,
Utah, 545 P.2d 190 (1976).

It is clear from the trial record

that the appellant's trial counsel raised no objection to the substance of any instructions at trial.
Despite this general approach to appeals of jury instruction issues, the appellant asserts that this appeal is appropriately taken under the authority of Rule l9(c), Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
1981).

Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-19(c) (Supp.

This rule states:

(Footnote 2 continued)

Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(b) provides that:
(b) Any person who violates subsection (l)(a) of this
section with respect to:
(iii) A substance classified in schedule IV or marihuana shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not more than five years or pay a fine of not more
than $5,000, or both.
(iv) A substance classified in schedule V shall,
upon conviction, be sentenced to one year in the county jail
or pay a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
The evidence presented at trial was intended to show that
the appellant was farming marijuana. No mention was made nor
evidence presented from which the court or the jury could infer
that the appellant was producing any other substance, which
Sponsored bybe
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(c) No party may assign as error any portion
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is instructed,
stating distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object,
error may be assigned to instructions in
order to avoid a manifest injustice.
(Emphasis Added)
This court very recently confronted the applicability of
Rule l9(c) in State v. Malmrose, No. 17661, June 22, 1982.
In that case the appellant claimed prejudicial error based on
the trial court's failure to give an instruction regarding the
inherent shortcomings of eyewitness identification.

This court

found such an instruction to be discretionary, and Rule 19(c)
inapplicable since the "[d]efendant makes no showing of injustice".

Id. at 4.

The manifest injustice in this case is readily apparent.
The appellant's conviction arises from a poorly drafted information whose language was erroneously duplicated in the trial
court's instructions to the jury.

Furthermore, the record

shows no introduction of evidence by the state of any crime
not amounting to a felony which would serve to reconcile the
charge with the proceedings, and therefore cure this glaring
error.
Blame for this error should be shared equally by counsel
for the state, trial counsel for the appellant, and the trial
court itself. Appellant should not be forced to suffer the consequence of a conviction due to an "oversight" at the hands of
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the those with whom he had entrusted his fate.

The appellant,

therefore, seeks reversal of his conviction on Count II of the
Information, with orders to the trial court to dismiss with
prejudice.
POINT II
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS
PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Prior to trial, counsel for appellant had submitted a
motion to suppress certain evidence which was seized from
appellant at the time of his arrest.

The motion was based on

the assertion that Detective Alexander did not have probable
cause to arrest the appellant and the search incident to an
illegal arrest was in violation of Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.

The appellant asserts that

denial of this motion was prejudicial error. 3
It has long been recognized that, although arrest warrants
are preferred, an officer may make an arrest without a warrant

3. The appellant asserts that all the items which were seized
concurrent to the unlawful arrest should be suppressed as evidence. Those items include: 4-P book, 11-P radio, 12-P backpack, 13-P trench coat, 18-P wallet, and 21-P rubber washers.
(R. 38, 91) All the above listed items were seized from appellants person and effects absent a lawful arrest.
The appellant respectfully submits that exclusive of these
suppressed items, the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction for production of a controlled substance. See
State v. Schroff, 30 Utah 2d 125, 514 P.2d 793 (1973).
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if he has "probable cause" to make the arrest.

The basic stan-

dard of probable was expressed in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
13 L.Ed.2d 142, 85 s.ct. 223 (1964), and has been oft-replicated
in various state court opinions.

The Court, per Mr. Justice

Stewart, stated the constitutionally valid arrest is one in
which:
. . . at the moment the arrest was made,
the officer had probable cause sto make it whether at the moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information
was sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the petitioner had committed
or was committing an offense.
379 U.S. at
91 [Cites ommitted].
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the essence of the Beck v.
Ohio, probable cause standard.

See State v. Eastmond, 499 P.2d

276 (1972), State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (1980).

The

requirement of probable cause to arrest without a warrant is
also reflected in the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure.

4.

4

Utah Code Annotated §77-7-2 (Supp. 1981) states:

77-7-2. BY PEACE OFFICERS. A peace officer may make an arrest
under authority of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest
a person:
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his
presence;
(2) When he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has
been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the
person arrested has committed it;
(3) When he has reasonable cause to believe the person
has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause
for believing the person may:
(a) Flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) Destroy or conceal evidence of the commission
of the offense; or
(c)
Injure another person or damage property belonging
to another person.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is the position of the appellant that the arresting
officer

h~rbored

a suspicion substantially less than probable

cause at the time of arrest.

This position is factually sup-

ported by the trial record.
First Eugene Lowin testified that only one gate was posted
and that a person might enter the land without seeing the "No
Trespassing" sign.

(R. 102-103).

Detective Alexander knew

or should have known that people might be in the area without
being aware of its restricted access.

Secondly, the purpose

of the expedition on August 21, 1980, was to confiscate items
within the compound and look for evidence of the perpetrator.
(R. 115).

The appellant was not a suspect at the time, nor

was anyone else.

Finally, Detective Alexander's initial obser-

vation of someone in the compound area was made by the naked
eye from approximately one-quarter mile away.

(R. 138).

There

is no testimony regarding any observed acts of cultivation which
would raise the officer's level of suspicion.
At the time the arresting officer encountered the appellant,
there were no reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was
a criminal offender.

Despite this lack of probable cause, the

officer arrested the appellant and searched his belongings in
hopes of finding incriminating evidence.

5

5. The appellant does not contest the authority of the officer
to conduct a preliminary inquiry of the type authorized by
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and its progeny. See State

-12-
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(Footnote 5 continued)
v. Folkes, Utah 565 P.2d 1125 (1977). The appellant's view
that any.preliminary questioning occurred after he was under
arrest and this status as a trespasser was confirmed after his
return to the compound is supported by the following excerpts
of trial testimony:
Defense Counsel: Now, when you got down to the scene down there,
you say you had occasion to find Mr. Leslie. Where exactly
did you find him, again?
Alexander:
If my directions serve me right, he was about 50
yards south of the compound on the right side.
Defense Counsel: Did you have occasion to speak with him?
Alexander: Yeah, after I placed him under arrest.
I just found
out he was trespassing and arrested him.
Defense Counsel:
So, the first thing you did was say, "You're
under arrest?"
Alexander: Well, I don't recall if that was the first thing.
I believe I might have turned around to Gene Lowin and asked
him if this guy was trespassing.
Defense Counsel: What was the first thing you said to Mr.
Leslie?
Alexander:
I don't recall.
(R. 141)

* * * *
Prosecutor: Now, when you were there, you said that as you
looked down into this valley where the compound area was, you
saw a figure; did you?
·
Lowin:
I didn't see a figure, no.
Prosecutor: When did you first see Mr. Leslie?
Lowin: After he was already down in the bottom.
Prosecutor:
I see. And you say it was about 50 yards south
of the compound area?
Lowin:
I just saw a sheriff's officer bringing Mr. Leslie to
the compound. That's the first time I saw him.
(R.

109-110)

* * * *
Prosecutor: At the time you observed Mr. Leslie in the area
of the compound, did you advise the narcotics officers that
he was trespassing?
Lowin: Yes.
(R.

101)
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An arrest made without probable cause is illegal, and

cannot be cured by what a subsequent search reveals. 6

The

Utah Supreme Court recently considered the issue of search incident to arrest in State v. Whittenback, supra.

That case

involved the search and arrest of defendants at an all-night
laundromat.

In affirming the conviction, this court ruled that

"[a]lthough the search itself precedes the arrest, the search
is still incident to arrest if at the time of the search the
officer had sufficient probable cause to make the arrest."
621 P.2d at 106.

7

Mere suspicion of criminal activity is not sufficient
grounds for arrest.

The appellant's arrest was made in the

absence of probable cause and the admission of evidence obtained
as a result of that

arres~

was prejudicial error.

There was no justification of the search of the Appellant
by Detective Alexander and the consequent search of his belongings which were the only items which could link him to the
cultivation of marijuana.

The case law is clear; the Motion

to Suppress should have been granted and the evidence seized
from the person and presence of Appellant suppressed prior to
trial.

6. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 4 L.Ed.2d 134,
80 S.Ct. 168 (1959) in which the Court, per Mr. Justice Douglas,
found that an illegal arrest cannot be made legal on the basis
of an incident search which yields contraband.
7.
It should be noted that Wittenback involved preliminary
questioning and observations by the arresting officer prior
to the search of defendants. The instant case is one in which
no Terry-type "stop and frisk" was made. However, the rule
that probable cause to arrest should exist before a search is
made
Sponsoredis
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POINT III
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION OF MISTRIAL
WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Near the close of the first day of trial, defense counsel
in the instant case moved for mistrial on the ground that one
of the jurors was having difficulty remaining awake.

The

appellant asserts that in failing to grant the motion the trial
court abused its discretion in such a way as to infringe upon
appellant's right to trial by jury.
The Sixth Amendment 8 of the United States Constitution
guarantees " . . . the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury.

"

While it is recognized that certain

actions lie within the discretion of the trial judge, a clear
showing that discretion has been abused allows an appellate
court to reverse and order a new trial.

State v. Belwood, 27

Utah 2d 214, 494 P.2d 519 (1972).
This court has not yet had the occasion to rule on the
issue of whether failure to discharge a dozing juror is beyond
the scope of discretion intended for the trial judge.

Little

reported case law exists from which guidance on this issue may
be gleaned.

However, the appellant cites two recent cases in

support of this argument.

8.

Utah

Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of
is almost identical in wording.
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United States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333 (3rd Cir. 1972),
is a federal case which held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in removing a juror who had appeared to be
asleep at various times during the trial.

The court stated:

We have no doubt that a juror who cannot
remain awake during much of the trial is
unable to perform his duty, and that the
Court did not abuse its discretion in
removing the juror in the circumstances
presented here.
464 F.2d at 335.
People v. Dupont, New York, 444 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1981), is another
case where a sleeping juror was discharged by the court.
that case, a

~

In

sponte determination was made by the court

that because a juror had been observed sleeping, by the trial
judge and other court personnel, at least six times, he was
not qualified to serve further.

In its brief analysis of the

issue, the court described the type of incapacity which might
justify disqualification of a juror, stating:
In People ex rel. Moore v. Fay, 238 F.
Supp. 1005, 1007, Judge Edward Weinfeld
of the United States District Court stated:
'The dereliction must be such
that it may be said to deprive
the parties of the continued
objective and disinterested
judgment of the juror, thereby
foreclosing a fundamentally
fair trial.'
(Cited by Mr. Justice Harold
Birns in People v. Phillips,
87 Misc.2d 613, 626, 384
N.Y.S.2d 906)
It is apparent that this juror, not having
heard all of the evidence, does not have
the capacity to serve in this case and is
therefore 'grossly unqualified' by reason
of such misconduct. 444 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
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These cases represent somewhat the converse of appellant's
claim; nevertheless, they do lend support to the position that
allowing an unqualified juror to continue to serve forecloses
appellant's right to a fundamentally fair trial.
It should be noted that the trial court was aware of the
potential problem prior to the motion for mistrial,

9

as sug-

gested by this brief dialogue:
THE COURT: Before we proceed further, Mr. Kilpack,
I'm not trying to single you out particularly, but
did I understand you correctly this morning when we
were empaneling the jury, that you had been up all
night?
JUROR KILPACK:

Yes.

THE COURT:
In the interest of, No. 1, I suppose
you getting some sleep, but more importantly, your
ability to remain awake during the proceedings, I
think maybe we better recess.
I noticed that you
have been having trouble keeping your eyes open.
JUROR KILPACK:

I have been doing my best.

THE COURT:
I understand that.
I am not criticizing,
but I understand the circumstances, and I don't
think we better continue on today.
(R. 189)
It is urged by the appellant that the trial court
has discretion in determining the course of proceeding at
trial.

U.C.A. §77-35-17(h) provides:

9.
The position that the appellant should be foreclosed from
raising this issue because he was aware that Mr. Kilpack had
had little sleep is untenable.
Counsel at trial accepted in
good faith Mr. Kilpack's oath to uphold his responsibilities
as a juror. His failure to do so, regardless of the circumstances, present legitimate grounds for examination of this
issue.
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(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or
disqualified during trial and an alternate
juror has been sleeted, the case shall
proceed using the alternate juror.
If no
alternate has been selected, the parties
may stipulate to proceed with the number
of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury
shall be discharged and a new trial
ordered.
This subsection allows for a trial to continue even when unf oreseen circumstances arise which result in loss of one of the
jurors.

By mutual agreement of the parties, the trial may con-

tinue without the disqualified juror or an alternate.

However,

if not agreement is reached, the entire jury is to be discharged
and a new trial ordered.
In the instant case, the fact that the trial court chose
not to remove juror Kilpack does not rehabilitate him as a qualified juror.

It is well within the limits of justice for a de-

fendant to move for mistrial when it is clear that his case
is not being attended to by the full membership of the jury
to which he is entitled.
The appellant submits that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing an obviously unqualified juror to remain
on the jury.

In light of this occurrence, the motion for mis-

trial was timely and refusal to grant it was error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the appellant respectfully
requests that the judgment and conviction be reversed and the
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case be remanded to the District Court for dismissal of Count
II, and dismissal of Count I, or alternatively, a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of

1982.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant was hand-delivered to the office
of the Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114 this 10th day of September, 1982.
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